Languages with gradual information-flow control combine static and dynamic techniques to prevent security leaks. Gradual languages should satisfy the gradual guarantee: programs that only differ in the precision of their type annotations should behave the same modulo cast errors. Unfortunately, Toro et al. [2018] identify a tension between the gradual guarantee and information security; they were unable to satisfy both properties in the language GSLRef and had to settle for only satisfying information-flow security. Azevedo de Amorim et al. [2020] show that by sacrificing type-guided classification, one obtains a language that satisfies both noninterference and the gradual guarantee. Bichhawat et al. [2021] show that both properties can be satisfied by sacrificing the no-sensitive-upgrade mechanism, replacing it with a static analysis.
In this paper we present a language design, LambdaIFCStar, that satisfies both noninterference and the gradual guarantee without making any sacrifices. We keep the type-guided classification of GSLRef and use the standard no-sensitive-upgrade mechanism to prevent implicit flows through mutable references. The key to the design of LambdaIFCStar is to walk back the decision in GSLRef to include the unknown label among the runtime security labels. We give a formal definition of LambdaIFCStar, prove the gradual guarantee, and prove noninterference. Of technical note, the semantics of LambdaIFCStar is the first gradual information-flow control language to be specified using coercion calculi (a la Henglein), thereby expanding the coercion-based theory of gradual typing.
Wed 26 JunDisplayed time zone: Windhoek change
16:00 - 17:20 | Security and CryptographyPLDI Research Papers at Finland / Norway Chair(s): Klaus v. Gleissenthall Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands | ||
16:00 20mTalk | A Tensor Compiler with Automatic Data Packing for Simple and Efficient Fully Homomorphic Encryption PLDI Research Papers Nikola Samardzic Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Aleksandar Krastev Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Simon Langowski Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Srinivas Devadas Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Daniel Sanchez MIT DOI | ||
16:20 20mTalk | Quantitative Robustness for Vulnerability Assessment PLDI Research Papers Guillaume Girol CEA, List, Université Paris Saclay, Guilhem Lacombe CEA LIST and Université Paris-Saclay, Sébastien Bardin CEA LIST, University Paris-Saclay DOI | ||
16:40 20mTalk | Quest Complete: The Holy Grail of Gradual Security PLDI Research Papers DOI Pre-print | ||
17:00 20mTalk | Foundational Integration Verification of a Cryptographic Server PLDI Research Papers Andres Erbsen Google, Jade Philipoom Google, Germany, Dustin Jamner MIT CSAIL, Ashley Lin Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Samuel Gruetter Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Clément Pit-Claudel EPFL, Adam Chlipala Massachusetts Institute of Technology DOI |